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ABSTRACT
Information and communication technologies occupy a central posi-
tion in the Covid-19 pandemic. Public response has been deemed 
extremely important, with social media platforms playing a key role 
in both institutional and bottom-up information sharing processes. 
The emerging field of platform studies has shown that platforms 
increasingly influence how society works; however, such studies often 
adopt a highly Western-centric approach. By focusing on Twitter and 
Weibo use in the early stages of the pandemic, the paper presents 
an exploratory study that comparatively explores the role of the two 
platforms for both Western and Chinese publics. Our findings indicate 
that during the Covid-19 outbreak, Weibo worked as a propaganda 
tool to unite the Chinese people and promote public policies under 
the control of the government and the guidance of the mainstream 
media. Twitter functioned more like a public discourse platform open 
to personal expression, often showing the influence of defined par-
tisan political discourses. We argue that the participatory dynamics 
characterizing Weibo and Twitter conversations at the outbreak of 
the pandemic at least partially mirrored the different ‘platforms soci-
eties’ currently developing in China and the West.
Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic that emerged at the end of 2019 was defined as a severe global 
threat by the World Health Organization (WHO), one which the whole world is currently 
fighting. This is not just a war in the field of medicine and public health, but also in the 
field of information and communication (Cinelli et al., 2020; Zarocostas, 2020). As WHO 
Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus observed, “We’re not just fighting an epi-
demic; we’re fighting an infodemic”, referring to an excessive volume of information about 
the problem that makes finding a solution more difficult (Zarocostas, 2020).
During a pandemic, people use social media platforms to acquire information (Burnap 
et al., 2014), but also to engage in participatory dynamics, expressing opinions and com-
menting, for instance, on local or international pandemic response strategies (Li et al., 
2020). However, social media platforms, as embedded in different sociocultural contexts, 
may shape these dynamics in different ways. To explore these differences – and contribute 
to research interested in the ‘regionality of platforms’ (Steinberg & Li, 2017) – this paper 
presents an exploratory study of Covid-19-related content on Weibo and Twitter.
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The following two sections review research developed from platform studies approaches, 
with a specific focus on studies stressing the need de-westernize the field. We then focus 
in on work looking at social media as participatory spaces and review research specifically 
focused on digital platforms at times of crisis before introducing this research’s data and 
methods. Finally, the paper discusses how, at the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
Weibo and Twitter reflected different platform societies.
Platform society
Digital platforms are not neutral: their governance, values, norms, and vernaculars influence 
how and what content is shared on them (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013). The emerging field 
of platform studies – a body of research focused on the norms and values embedded in 
digital media platforms (Gillespie, 2010; Van Dijck et al., 2018) – has shown that platform 
devices (e.g. hashtags and @ mentions) and mechanisms (e.g. engagement metrics and 
metadata) increasingly affect how stories are told, information is circulated, and connections 
are made. These devices and mechanisms characterize the current ‘platformization’ of the 
web – the increasing influence of social media platforms on web data flows and online 
user practices (Helmond, 2015), with online content acquiring value for both platforms 
and public and private services (Van Dijck et al., 2018).
Platform studies, however, as a field of inquiry, tends to offer a Western-centric theo-
rization of platform roles and values. Van Dijck et al. (2018) ‘platform society’, for instance, 
is intrinsically a Western one, dominated by the ‘Big Five platform corporations’ (Alphabet 
Google Inc., Amazon Inc., Apple Inc., Facebook Inc., and Microsoft Inc.). Several scholars 
have discussed platforms’ various societal functions – such as promoting democratization 
processes, providing the public with a wider space for engagement, and coordinating con-
flicts between different areas of society – from a Western perspective (see Beer & Burrows, 
2007; Helmond, 2015; Sobré-Denton, 2016). Such views are often taken to be universally 
applicable, without considering the impact of different sociocultural contexts on the roles 
and values of social media platforms. The ‘digital universalism’ underlying these views is 
being increasingly called into question by a new wave of research directly interested in 
the ‘regionality of platforms’ (Steinberg & Li, 2017): how platforms – with their uses, 
cultures and values – are shaped by different regional settings. Willems, for instance, has 
recently introduced the concept of ‘relational affordances’ to shed light on the need to 
overcome the limitations of current academic debates that ‘focus on the intrinsic features 
of technology […], thereby neglecting the way in which broader environments and contexts 
shape the use of technology’ (2020, p. 4).
The Chinese digital ecosystem has so far offered the most fertile ground for the growth 
of non-western centric platform studies. In their analysis of the infrastructural turn of the 
Chinese platform WeChat, Plantin and de Seta offer an observation that is particularly 
representative of the growing ‘de-westernization’ of platform studies and of the increasing 
interest in the Chinese ‘platform model’: ‘Chinese internet companies that own the country’s 
largest digital platforms have tight (albeit sometimes conflictual) relationships with national 
policy-making and regulatory authorities. These relationships […] result in a platform 
model that is simultaneously shaped by the characteristics of Chinese national media reg-
ulations and allowed to flourish as a vector of infrastructure building’ (2019, p. 267). In 
line with this work, Wang and Lobato have called for a ‘spatialized platform theory’ – one 
that pays attention to platforms’ historical and contextual trajectories and assesses how 
these trajectories influence platform designs within frames of reference that may not align 
with the liberal democratic model of free speech and free markets (2019, 367). Wang and 
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Lobato (2019) accent on democratic ontologies sheds light on how the contemporary call 
for relational and contextual approaches to digital platforms is also central to our under-
standing of participatory dynamics across contemporary ‘platform societies’.
Platforms and participatory cultures
Since its inception, the digital media environment has been considered to have the potential 
to enhance democratic exchanges of ideas and opinions (Papacharissi, 2002). Adapting or 
reformulating Habermas’ ideal type of media and the public sphere, several studies have 
investigated the emergence of critical public opinion within the networked publics devel-
oping on social media platforms. The focus of these studies is often on discursive dynamics 
developing on Twitter around the use of issue or activist hashtags (Papacharissi, 2015; 
Rambukkana, 2015). In more specific terms, research has shown that Twitter’s socio-technical 
infrastructure – especially its affordances enabling bottom-up curation practices – has 
allowed the coming to prominence of actors who have been traditionally defined as 
‘non-elite’, namely ordinary users ( Hermida, 2015; Jackson & Foucault Welles, 2015, 2016; 
Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Reilly & Vicari, 2021; Vicari, 2017; Vicari et al., 2020). These 
dynamics have then brought changes to traditional gatekeeping practices, with citizens 
often becoming primary sources of information, or gatekeepers, for both traditional 
non-elites (i.e. other citizens) and elite users (i.e. legacy media). These changes have not 
entirely suppressed traditional power structures; they have turned traditional media systems 
into ‘hybrid’ (Chadwick, 2017) ecosystems.
The ‘public sphere’ constructed by Chinese digital media has however been shown to 
hold completely different characteristics from those found in Western society (Shao & 
Wang, 2017). In their early Internet research, Kalathil and Boas (2001) highlighted the 
impact of authoritarian regimes on Internet use, drawing attention to how, in those 
contexts, digital media have often been used to both extend authoritarian reach and 
push forward national development. According to the authors, in China – a one-party 
regime – the absence of ideational pluralism has characterized both offline and online 
contexts. In the environment of ‘party-managed media’, the Chinese government has been 
proactive in exploiting the reach of digital platforms to guide public consensus and 
strengthen the Chinese state (Barmé, 2009; Huang & Yu, 1997; Kalathil & Boas, 2001). 
One of the most common strategies has been to establish government propaganda centers 
to distribute online propaganda and engage in ‘thought work’ (Kalathil & Boas, 2001; 
Weber & Jia, 2007).
Contemporary social media in China does not play the same role in relation to 
participatory practices as Western platforms do (Bomsel, 2014) – even in a context 
where the political function of Chinese media is in dynamic development, and gradually 
playing an increasingly important role (Yang, 2003; Yang & Calhoun, 2007). These 
differences stem from local dynamics that influence user practices related to, for instance, 
how opinions are expressed, what content is being produced, distributed and used, and 
which users become influential in gatekeeping dynamics – in selecting what becomes 
visible on social media platforms (Yang, 2016). Han (2018), for instance, has traced 
three phases in the evolution of Weibo as a Chinese microblogging medium – from 
one prioritizing civic-minded public engagement, a second celebrating individual fame 
and a third foregrounding the monetization of user-generated content. Ultimately, this 
work shows that the Chinese platform ecosystem has developed through the tightening 
of China’s state control over digital media and at the intersection of corporate and 
public interests.
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In line with research highlighting the need to regionalize platform studies approaches 
and challenge digital universalism, in this paper we explore digital participatory cultures 
across platform societies. We do so by focusing on discursive practices emerging on Weibo 
and Twitter at the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Participatory dynamics are particularly salient at times of crisis, with digital platforms 
having both positive and negative societal effects. On the one hand, social media discursive 
practices have been shown to improve the relationship between the government and the 
public (Palen, 2008), help effective information transmission (Austin et al., 2012; Roshan 
et al., 2016), reduce the spread of false information (Jennex, 2010), contain uncertainty 
(Lachlan et al., 2014), mobilize the public’s enthusiasm (Lachlan et al., 2016), and increase 
public cohesion (Alexander, 2014). On the other hand, findings also show that social media 
can facilitate the dissemination of rumors (Liu et al., 2014), generate public panic (Depoux 
et al., 2020; Ng & Lean, 2012), and increase the public’s burden of screening effective 
information (Heverin & Zach, 2010).
In the specific context of health crises, social media interactions have been studied as 
a means to predict epidemic outbreaks (Kostkova et al., 2014; St Louis & Zorlu, 2012), 
monitor public behavior (Broniatowski et al., 2013), provide telemedicine assistance (Lee 
et al., 2014), and build mutual help communities (Chew & Eysenbach, 2010). During the 
Covid-19 pandemic, digital platforms have become a site to communicate concerns 
regarding health, illnesses, and treatments (Ahmad & Murad, 2020), but also a means to 
share personal opinions and political views on the handling of pandemic response strat-
egies by national and international authorities (de Saint Laurent et al., 2021; MacDonald, 
2020; Vicari et al., 2020). Most of the existing platform studies interested in the public 
response to the pandemic have analyzed Western social media. To address this limitation 
and, more broadly, to contribute to the ‘de-westernization’ of platform studies, this paper 
presents a comparative exploration of participatory dynamics developing on Weibo and 
Twitter when the Covid-19 pandemic started, respectively, in China and the West. We 
explore these dynamics by specifically addressing three research questions:
RQ1: What sentiment characterised Weibo and Twitter content at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
respectively, in China and in the West?
RQ2: What topics circulated on Weibo and Twitter at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, respec-
tively, in China and in the West?
RQ3: How did gatekeeping dynamics unfold on Weibo and Twitter at the start of the Covid-19 
pandemic, respectively, in China and in the West?
Data and methods
This exploratory study focuses on the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic – in China 
in early February 2020 and in the West one month later – to investigate the roles of 
Weibo and Twitter in enhancing the emergence of participatory dynamics. As the most 
prominent microblogging services respectively in China and the West, these two social 
media platforms are considered to have similar characteristics (Bolsover & Howard, 
2019), with some scholars defining Weibo as the ‘Chinese Twitter’ (Jiang et al., 2015). 
Existing research shows that their public nature and microblogging infrastructure make 
these platforms particularly suited for enhancing participatory practices within discourse 
communities emerging around issue hashtags ( on Twitter, see Highfield & Bruns, 2015; 
Papacharissi, 2015; Rambukkana, 2015. On Weibo, see Han, 2018; Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 
2015; Yang, 2016 ). Hence, the two platforms are suitable objects of investigation to 
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provide comparative insights into participatory dynamics in both Western and Chinese 
contexts (Bolsover & Howard, 2019).
We collected Covid-19-related Weibo posts and tweets published respectively on 4th 
and 5th February, and on 1st and 2nd March 2020. Given the exploratory nature of the 
research, the short time frame was assessed as being long enough to provide a picture of 
user practices in the early phase of the pandemic in both contexts. We used Python to 
collect Weibo posts via six keyword queries based on what Weibo identified as the top 
trending coronavirus hashtags: “#新冠” (Covid-19, xinguan), “#新冠肺炎” (Covid-19 pneu-
monia, xinguanfeiyan), “#新冠疫情” (Covid-19 epidemic, xinguanyiqing), “#新冠病毒” 
(Covid-19 virus, xinguanbingdu), “#新型冠状肺炎” (Novel coronavirus pneumonia, xinx-
ingguanzhuangfeiyan), “#新型冠状病毒” (Novel coronavirus, xinxingguanzhuangbingdu). 
301,000 individual posts were randomly collected from Weibo. The text in these posts was 
segmented using the Python-based open-source toolkit ‘Jieba’.1
We then used the Twitter Capture and Analysis Tool (TCAT) to run a live tweet collection 
via keyword queries based on the top trending Covid-19 Twitter hashtags in early March 
2020: #COVID, #COVID19, #Coronavirus, #SARSCoV2, #WuhanCoronavirus, #WuhanVirus, 
#CoronavirusOutbreak, #nCoV19, and #nCoV2019. These hashtags were identified using the 
Symplur Healthcare Hashtag Project (Symplur, 2020). We limited the collection to tweets in 
English to make the study more manageable. Out of the 2,830,052 tweets returned by TCAT, 
we randomly selected 301,000 tweets to match the volume of the data collected from Weibo.
To address the research questions, three analytical techniques were employed: sentiment 
analysis, semantic network analysis, and repost/retweet network mapping. Sentiment analysis 
computationally identifies and categorizes the opinions expressed in a piece of text to determine 
whether the writer’s attitude is positive, negative, or neutral (Serrano-Guerrero et al., 2015). 
This technique was applied to uncover attitudes and emotions expressed by Chinese and 
Western publics about the Covid-19 epidemic on Twitter and Weibo (RQ1). Twitter and Weibo 
data were respectively analyzed with SentiStrength and NLPIR sentiment analysis software.
Semantic network analysis combines text analytics and network analysis to provide 
quantitative and qualitative insight into processes of meaning production. It measures and 
maps the co-occurrence of words in a text, so that researchers can provide insight into the 
semantic features of the text itself (Drieger, 2013). In this study, semantic network analysis 
helped to explore the topics discussed in relation to Covid-19 on the two platforms (RQ2).
Finally, we used repost/retweet network mapping to investigate gatekeeping dynamics 
(RQ3). This is a technique commonly used to identify prominent users in social media 
interactions (see Jackson & Foucault Welles, 2015, 2016; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Reilly 
& Vicari, 2021; Vicari, 2017). All the network visualizations presented in this paper were 
produced with Gephi 0.9.2, a network analysis and visualization software. For ethical 
purposes, in the next sections the handles of all Weibo and Twitter accounts not directly 
associated to organizations or public figures have been anonymised.
Findings
Platforms and sentiment
The visualization of sentiment analysis results (Figure 1) shows that the highest percentages 
of Covid-19 posts in the Weibo dataset are concentrated in the lower left (1, −4 and 1, 
−5) and upper right (4, −1 and 5, −1) corners of the chart. Authors of these posts used 
evaluative expressions, including extremely positive (15.9%) and extremely negative (28.83%) 
ones. The proportion of posts showing similar dynamics in the Twitter dataset, whether 
positive (10.03%) or negative (7.5%), is smaller.
6 Z. YANG AND S. VICARI
Most of the Weibo posts showing positive sentiment revolved around support, under-
standing and praise for the Chinese government’s epidemic response measures, as well as 
praise for some heroic characters, such as Zhong Nanshan, a Chinese pulmonologist who 
played an important role during the epidemic.
I am really touched that the first batch of medical supplies has already been shipped to Wuhan. I am 
so proud of my country and its quick countermeasures facing the Covid-19 epidemic. (04/02/2020)
I personally firmly support the Chinese government’s decision on the epidemic in Wuhan, and I will 
never go out and cause any trouble for the government and my motherland. (04/02/2020)
Mentioning the word hero, I immediately think of Zhong Nanshan. His stalwart image in our hearts 
cannot be forgotten. (04/02/2020).
Content expressing negative sentiment most often related to ‘the epidemic’ or ‘the virus’ 
itself, with only a few negative comments about the Chinese government and its actions, 
or the lockdown policy in Wuhan.
The coronavirus is really abominable, hateful and also fearsome. (05/02/2020).
Figure 1. sentiment analysis of Covid-19 posts on weibo and twitter.
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The outbreak of this terrible epidemic caused panic among the whole Chinese people. The sharp increase 
in the number of infections every day makes people more and more afraid, and dare not go out or 
socialize. (05/02/2020)
The different expressions of sentiment on Weibo and Twitter provides initial evidence 
that the two platforms might have played different roles during the Covid-19 outbreak in 
China and the West. The results of sentiment analysis will be combined with the results 
of semantic analysis and report/retweet mapping in the following subsections.
Platforms and semantics
The visualizations of Weibo and Twitter semantic networks (Figure 2) show clear differences 
between the content of Covid-19 Weibo posts and tweets. First, the Weibo semantic net-
work is more centralized than the Twitter one, with the density of lines (i.e. relations of 
co-occurrence) between Weibo nodes (i.e. words) being denser than those between Twitter 
ones. Degree centrality measures were used to identify the top ten semantic nodes, namely 
Figure 2. semantic network of Covid-19 posts on weibo and twitter (node size based on indegree 
centrality; node color based on clusterization; forceatlas2 layout algorithm applied).
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the words that were most frequently mentioned (Leydesdorff, 2007; Opsahl et al., 2010) 
(Table 1). The top ten nodes in the Weibo semantic network have higher centrality than 
the corresponding nodes in the Twitter semantic network, which means that meaning 
production on Weibo was more centralized: Weibo users were likely to produce content 
on a smaller number of ‘hot’ topics.
At the semantic level, the discussion of Covid-19 on Weibo focused more on government-led 
behavioral measures: verbs or verb-object collocations occupy a great proportion of core 
nodes in the Weibo semantic network, such as ‘suggest’, ‘prevention and control’, ‘must’, ‘go 
out’, ‘stay home’, ‘release’, ‘resist’, and ‘masks’. In other words, the Weibo semantic network 
suggests that the narrative most likely to circulate on Weibo was that relating to the efforts 
of the Chinese government’s ‘prevention and control’ of the epidemic, ‘experts’ ‘suggest’ that 
the public should not ‘go out’, try to ‘stay home’ as much as possible, and wear ‘masks’ if 
they ‘go out’, to ‘resist’ viruses. The Weibo semantic network also shows a large number 
of military metaphors commonly used in the Chinese government’s epidemic prevention 
directives, such as “million people united as one man” (万众一心) or “our wills unite like 
a fortress” (众志成城). Overall, the diffusion of government educational propaganda thus 
seems to have played a core role in the discussion of Covid-19 on Weibo.
The Twitter semantic network is looser than the Weibo one, which means that the 
discussion was more diversified. Proper nouns, especially the names of countries, institu-
tions, organizations and public figures, occupy an important part of the main nodes in 
the Twitter network, such as ‘China’, ‘mainland’, ‘US’, ‘Japan’, ‘WHO’, ‘BBC’, and ‘CNN’. 
Evidence seems to suggest that the Twitter discussion of Covid-19 functioned more like 
a transnational live stream of the events, with key Western figures (e.g. such as then-US 
President Donald Trump) clearly emerging in the discussion. Events and response measures 
in different countries and regions, as well as reports released by different international 
organizations and news agencies, were all within the scope of attention of Twitter users.
Platforms and gatekeeping
The differences between the sentiment and semantic aspects of Covid-19 discussions on 
Weibo and Twitter are also reflected in the gatekeeping practices on the two platforms (see 
Figure 3). Our analysis shows that the top reposted sources on Weibo were official news 
organizations controlled by the Chinese government, such as @Peoples Daily, @CCTV, and 
@Xinhua Viewpoint. The fact that gatekeeping dynamics were highly influenced by main-
stream, state-controlled news organizations further explains why many propaganda slogans 
with military metaphors appear in the semantic network of the Covid-19 discussion on 
Weibo. Chinese mainstream news organizations, such as People’s Daily, endorsed the response 
measures adopted by the Chinese government and further foregrounded them on Weibo. 
Table 1. nodes with top degree centrality in the two semantic networks.
weibo twitter
node degree Centrality node degree Centrality
Health 1,137 person 454
shuanghuanlian 664 washington 451
Coronavirus 622 state 445
novel 603 CoVid-19 444
2020 553 died 436
China 524 say 424
Epidemic situation 494 coronavirus 389
masks 403 death 365
Pneumonia 396 first 362
HOWARD JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS 9
Eventually, through the megaphone function of these official news organizations, the plat-
form became a powerful propaganda channel for the Chinese government in response to 
Covid-19. Looking closely at the most frequently reposted accounts in the Weibo network, 
it is also possible to notice a small number of individual users, who might be considered 
‘Internet celebrities’, such as @Liyongle Teacher and @Wang Bingru. It is important to 
highlight that in the Weibo environment, these are not typical Internet celebrities, who are 
mostly young Chinese entertainment stars (DeLisle et al., 2016). However, @Liyongle Teacher 
and @Wang Bingru – each having more than two million followers – stood out in the 
discussion because they closely followed the Chinese government’s propaganda strategy and 
actively endorsed its response measures. In sum, China’s official news organizations – along 
with a small number of minor Internet celebrities – formed a propaganda alliance that 
became the main information source for the wider discussion about Covid-19 on Weibo.
Figure 3 and Table 2 show that the top retweeted sources on Twitter were more diverse 
than those on Weibo. Apart from a small number of prominent US public figures, such 
as Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), democratic congressman Ted Lieu (@Tedlieu) and 
actor James Woods (@realJamesWood), a variety of other users turned into key informers. 
Figure 3. weibo repost network and twitter retweet network (node size based on indegree centrality; 
node color based on clusterization; forceatlas2 layout algorithm applied).
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Table 2. nodes with top indegree centrality in the weibo repost network and twitter retweet 
network.
weibo twitter
node indegree node indegree
@People’s daily 19,565 @oH_mes2 8,005
@liyongle teacher 9,033 @tedlieu 4,787
@Global time news 8,472 @username1 4,589
@i am Jerry Guo 8,191 @username2 2,774
@Headlines news 6,965 @surgeon_General 2,693
@CCtV 5,477 @realdonaldtrump 2,531
@CCtV news 4,984 @charliekirk11 2,292
@wang Bingru 4,082 @Education4libs 2,274
@CCtV.net 3,484 @realJameswoods 2,191
@Xinhua Viewpoint 2,445 @username3 2,151
For instance, @OH_mes2 – a news aggregator account mainly sharing reports from South 
Korean news outlets – became the top retweeted account of our two-day observation 
period. A number of ‘ordinary users’ also became prominent sources of information in 
the discussion of Covid-19. These – unlike the Internet celebrities on Weibo – had very 
different attitudes and views about Covid-19 and the response measures of different coun-
tries. For instance, Twitter users @Username5 and @Username6 held contrasting views on 
Trump’s policy measures against Covid-19. These were further retweeted and commented 
on by other users who might support or oppose them. The lack of official sources of 
information further expands the possibility of diversification of public discussion on 
Covid-19 and on different countries’ response measures. Therefore, compared to Weibo, 
which seemingly had a ‘propaganda’ role, Twitter acted more like a ‘messy public square’ 
where a number of diverse users (e.g. media, politicians, citizens) were actively engaged 
in – and in some cases highly influenced – the discussion.
Discussion and conclusion
Our findings show that at the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in China and in the 
West, Weibo and Twitter played very different roles as participatory platforms embedded 
in different sociocultural contexts. As shown in previous research on the Chinese digital 
ecosystem during epidemics (Dodson, 2010; Weber & Jia, 2006), authoritarian propa-
ganda mechanisms clearly emerged on Weibo, with the accounts of major official media 
like People’s Daily engaging in ‘thought work’ (Kalathil & Boas, 2001). However, our 
findings also show that, not only did state propaganda nudge behavior change through 
key national media outlets, it also developed propaganda networks through individual 
‘Internet celebrities’. For instance, propaganda slogans with clear nationalist tendencies, 
such as “million people united as one man” (万众一心) and “our wills unite like a 
fortress” (众志成城) not only appeared widely across official media Weibo accounts – 
such as People’s Daily, CCTV, Xinhua Viewpoint – they were also forwarded, absorbed, 
re-created and disseminated by individual ‘Internet celebrities’. It is these ‘propaganda’ 
mechanisms that most likely also led to polarizing sentiment in Weibo conversations 
about the pandemic. These dynamics did not apply to the ‘democratized’ Western world 
where other forms of influence were exerted. Contrary to previous work highlighting 
the emerging prominence of non-elite gatekeepers in Twitter networks (Jackson & 
Foucault Welles, 2015, 2016; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Vicari, 2017), our exploratory 
investigation indicated that elite accounts – which can affect the political agenda – 
probably played a more central role than non-elite accounts. It is likely that these elite 
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accounts also influenced the overall framing of the events on the platform – foreground-
ing messages not necessarily in line with public health policies or scientific evidence. 
This was signaled, for instance, by the centrality of then-US President Donald Trump’s 
account in the retweet network.
In conclusion, Weibo and Twitter enhanced very different participatory dynamics at the 
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The two platforms hosted different forms of sentiment 
expression, meaning production and gatekeeping dynamics. Weibo displayed more ‘top-down’ 
processes while Twitter content incorporated a range of dynamics: elite influence, horizontal 
flows, conflicting opinions, and political framings of the events. In their being embedded 
in wider socio-cultural contexts, political economic frameworks and social structures, these 
platforms can then be seen as reflecting the different ‘platforms societies’ currently devel-
oping in China and in the West. In China, platforms can become ‘propaganda tools’ used 
to unite and promote public policies under the control of the government and the guidance 
of state-controlled mainstream media. In Western societies platforms can work as ‘public 
squares’ that allow the expression of different personal opinions, though under the influence 
of elite media – legacy news media outlets – and public figures with different political 
agendas. Democratic governments often find themselves struggling to impose effective 
regulation on platforms that have grown rapidly without their immediate oversight (Van 
Dijck et al., 2018). Unlike authoritarian states that make every effort to use a variety of 
reactive and proactive strategies to control digital media use (Kalathil & Boas, 2001), 
Western countries – and platform companies – are increasingly struggling to control 
dynamics that make platforms unfit for public discussion and enhance democratic devel-
opment (e.g. bots, flaming, disinformation, hate speech).
Ultimately, this study advances a twofold contribution. First, it provides evidence of the 
limitations in framing contemporary societies as beholden to a monolithic ‘platform society’ 
(Van Dijck et al., 2018) model as this model fails to map dynamics that are developing 
in non-Western contexts (Steinberg & Li, 2017). In fact, it points to the need to further 
develop platform studies that take into account the local contexts in which platforms are 
developed, used and regulated (Willems, 2020). Second, it calls for further comparative 
work aimed at investigating platform participatory dynamics, and their implications for 
society, at times of global crisis.
It is important to highlight that this study is affected by several limitations. First, the 
analysis focused on dynamics at the center of Weibo and Twitter conversations about the 
pandemic – those around polarizing sentiment, most frequently used content, and top 
gatekeepers – skimming over what was happening at ‘the periphery’ of these conversations. 
Also, our quantitative approach did not allow us to focus on these conversations and 
explore less explicit dynamics of meaning production, like the ironic or sarcastic exchanges 
that have been shown to be particularly relevant to Chinese social media publics (see, 
among others, Yang, 2016). Future research could address these limitations by developing 
mixed-method approaches incorporating small data analyses of Weibo and Twitter content.
Note
 1. Chinese text is formed by characters, with two or more characters forming a word; individual words 
are joined together in a sentence without natural segmentation.
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